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Aristotle, by J . D. G. Evans: Sussex, Hamsters and New York, St. Martin's, 
1987. Pp. xii + 208. $29.95. Aristotle and Equality and Justice by W. von 
Lcyden: New York, St. Martin's, 1985. Pp. ix + 145. $32.50. Reviewed by P. 
T. Asselin, Hillsdale College. 
Evan's book is a compendium of Aristotle's philosophy, von Leyden's 
an interpretation of some of Aristotle's statements on justice and equality 
and an adaptation to (undefined) contemporary questions. 
Dialectic is the central theme of Evan's first chapter. Aristotle's genius 
is his considering all evidences, including common opinion, and then 
letting concrete objects display their own structures. This was an advance, 
first, because Aristotle recognized a wide variety of entitles as real and, 
second, because be recognized real complexity within objects, as is 
evident in the hylomophic theory. Accordingly, science must be divided 
by (material and) formal object, because "things do not all fall within any 
one definite kind. There is no kind of thing such that every thing is of that 
kind" (Evans, p. 17). 
The belief that teleology is not actually present in natural objects is a 
common objection to Aristotelianism. Aristotle thought that teleology was 
evident in the fact of change, the actualization of potential qua potential. 
"A potential property is one which can be defined only by reference to the 
result to which it tends. (E.g.l The defense of the possibility of learning 
relics on the notion of knowledge, which is the final cause of the process:" 
(p. 98). The telos is evident to the mind, it would take objects (e.g. the 
process of learning) and analyze them as realities that flow from 
constitutive principles, causes, and occasions (e.g. ignorance and 
knowledge, act and potency). 
Aristotle's contributions to theology are the arguments that there 
exists one and necessarily only one first and final cause of motion, and that 
his same God is pure actuality, hence the direct object of his ('he'-theos, 
nous) own contemplative activity. These form a middle way between the 
theology in the second part of the Parmenides ("God has no concern for 
human affairs"), which, against Plalo, Aristotle accepts,and the later. Stoic 
position that Cod is irrelevant to cosmic order. The good of the world as a 
whole is its orientation toward the"perfection of the self-absorption of the 
primary substance." That perfection as final cause "makes all other things 
in the universe better than they otherwise might be" (p. 185). This a sound 
statement of the uniqueness of Aristotle's theology: nothing of Cod's won 
entity is participated by other objects, yet Cod is in all things by an 
extrinsic denomination, inasmuch as they seek his perfection. 
Other concepts and issues that Evans treats arc: form, matter, and 
privation as principles of physical change (pp. 87-89); the problem ot 
backward causation, which Evans thinks mistakenly arises from not 
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grasping change and development as expressions of formality and finality 
(pp. 9 0 - % ) ; and how the unrestricted range of the objects of human 
thought requires, first, that the mind "be" all things potentially and, 
second, that in itself it be no physical thing (p. 128). Ross's Aristotle 
remains the best compendium in English, but Evans's is clear, mostly 
accurate and interesting. 
R a w s include that the bibliography does not recognize approaches to 
Aristotle that compete with Evans's own, which is more or less analytic. 
Second, let me again refer to Evans's treatment of the claim that the mind, 
in order to think all things, must be independent of matter. The proper 
consequence is not that the mind "is a pure potentiality and only acquires 
actual existence when actually thinking" (p. 128), but that it is a pure 
potentiality in the line of operative or second actuality. It must exist in 
order to think, but its substance cannot itself be that of the material object 
that it thinks. Third, von Leydcn's book was published by St. Martin's, as 
was Evans's, and not by Macmillan (see p. 191). 
Von Leyden aims to "contribute to the discussion of Aristotelian as 
well as modern questions of (a) how to render the principle of equality, no 
less than that in inequality, compatible with that of fairness, and (b) how to 
combine the facts of individual as well as social diversity in civil life with 
the demands for political justice and cohesion" (p. vii). 
The focus of his first chapter is the permanent (="natural"?) conflict 
between the few and the many. The conflict, von Leyden shows, is between 
qualitative rather than quantitative claims to rule. The few might be the 
wealthy, the otherwise privileged or gifted,or administrative specialists. 
The many value liberty, have sound judgment as to general directions of 
public policy, and a grasp of moral values to allow that certain yes/no 
questions be decided by plebiscite. Proportionate equality, i.e. treating like 
cases alike and different ones differently, exists in varying ways in popular 
regimes. It is necessary to define qualitative differences and distinctions 
in value (p. 25), in order that his equality be achieved. 
Looking at a narrow physical conception (sameness in species or kind) 
and the analogous, transcategorical, metaphysical concept of equal in the 
next chapter, von Leyden concludes: '"equality* is a common term and as 
such stands for a pervasive concept...|which| docs not per se indicate 
common features or refer to what is common to all parts of a given w h o l e -
such as the state" (p. 40). 
Aristotle's attempt to apply the principle of proportionate equality to 
the whole of a society fails. Proportionate equality requires a common 
term, whereas the contributions of various members of a political society 
are specifically and qualitatively different (pp. 56-57). Von Leyden next 
treats his attempt to establish a basis for a common equality between 
diverse components of a body politic. Because he is committed to having 
a state whose members are equals and peers as far as possible. Aristotle is 
in fact committed to equality as fairness. Nevertheless, the equitable 
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calculus used to distribute power must "start from the assumption that the 
...classes disagree and would pursue conflicting policies". Moreover, 
Aristotle cannot justify the oligarchic privilege, which is, ultimately, wealth. 
Therefore it is unlikely that equalizing qualitative and quantitative claims 
could bring about equality (p. 62). the practical solution is to decide by lot 
That , however, cannot produce justice and equality directly and 
consciously, even if it docs so constitutionally. 
Von Lcydcn argues in Chapter Four that Aristotle favors a legal 
system that is both based on nature and open to reform. In favoring 
stability, Aristotle concedes that pure practical reason is insufficient. First, 
while tradition is as such is not normative, still it is necessary. Second, 
respect of law, and obedience to it, are normative principles. Von Leyden 
notes that the permanence implied by nature and the gradualism 
required by his own interpretation partly conflict (p. 105). At any rate, 
Aristotle is not a radical egalitarian and disfavors revolution. Yet his belief 
that the few and many both have civic virtue allows that "equality can be 
imposed upon people who are unfairly discriminated against as a result of 
the low assessment of their value or usefulness as citizens" (p. 114). 
All these are critical and interesting issues. But having read the entire 
book twice, and parts four-plus times, I judge that it lacks a definable 
viewpoint. The beliefs that Aristotle has a unified argument on equality 
and justice and that we should be concerned with uncovering it are not 
demonstrated. Doubtless equality and justice concerned Aristotle and are 
important questions today. But the reader needs to understand, first, why 
the author thinks so, and, second, why he thinks that Aristotle is a good 
teacher. 
Essays, Comments, and Reviews, by William James. In The Works of 
William fames. Edited by Frederick I I . Burkhardt, Fredson Bowers, ami 
Ignas K. Skrupskelis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, IW7. 
Reviewed by C. S. Schreiner, Pennsylvania State University. 
Pooled here with editorial expertise is an omnium-gatherum ol 25 
expository essays, 44 letters to the editor, and 113 book reviews in a display 
of James's career beginning with his first publication in 1865-a review of an 
anatomy book by Thomas Huxley in the North American Review. One is 
first struck by an unbound curiosity which roams from Morley (on Voltaire) 
to Wundt to Lipps; Royce and Rcnouvicr; a novel by Crimm; Bcrnhard 
Bercnson ' s Florentine Painters of the Renaissance. In its apparent 
heterogeneity this volume of the collected works, the seventeenth 
published by Harvard UP, reveals an element of James's work usually 
excluded from philosophical forums. This could be called the 
backpressure of his thought in the exigency of working out what Eugen 
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Bleu lor once called the disporportion between striving and understanding. 
One is provoked less to assimilate James* thought to recent work in 
neopragmatism or phenomenology than to discuss the philosophical 
significance of his apparently longstanding interest in problems such as 
dementia, effort, emotivity, energetics, and the morbid and creative 
dynamics of volition. Such research, at once personal and scientific, 
moved his philosophy to stress the dynamogenic complicity of effort and 
idea in their capacity to snap inanition and stimulate a creative pulsation 
through which truth is brought about as activity or becoming. 
For here is a sensibility which always situates the act as the very 
camber of a life of thinking, forcing that life into public argument; and that 
thinking, through the act of writing, disposes of itself in public as a 
necessary condition of it development. How odd to us today seems the 
imbrication of this thinking-writing with non-academic culture. In a letter 
to the editor of the Springfield Daily Republican in 1903, James strongly 
protests against the lynching epidemic, accusing American newspaper 
coverage of converting lynching "into an established institution" (171). 
lames did not publish only in specialized journal each with their own 
nomenclature. The writing, to borrow a phrase from William Bass, 
convokes a community of writers. There are pieces here from The Monist 
and The Psychological Review and Philosophical Review, but also from the 
Nation, Boston Evening Transcript, New York Evening Post, Science, 
Atlantic Monthly, and Forest and Stream. 
The editorial apparatus for this critical edition provides copy-text and 
emendation data for each publication, and letters and notes which inform 
one of the circumstances in which a manuscript was generated. For 
instance, as context for a letter to the editor "Abbot against Koycc" which 
appeared in the Nation in 1891, we are provided with a letter James wrote 
to his sister Alice informing her of his submission: 'The only excitement in 
our domestic circle is the Abbot Royce Controversy into which I have been 
drawn (see the Nation) by Charles Peirce's letter" (682). Professor 
Skrupskclis's introduction and textual apparatus also contribute to our 
understanding of the complicated publishing situation which confronted 
James as his career evolved. Surely one cannot fully grasp the aims and 
rhetorical ambience of James's writing without familiarizing oneself with 
the cultural conditions and publishing scene which shaped it and made it 
possible. 
Given the jumble of James's intellectual cargo found in this text and 
essays-including a piece on the need for more vacation time in America 
("Vacations") and a critique of academic crcdcntialism ( 'The Ph.D. 
Octopus")--one can at least say that the material gathered here shows the 
problems and reading practices which informed the development of 
pragmatism and radical empiricism. At one point James saw the future of 
philosophy as belonging to cither Hcgclianism or the philosophy of 
Renouvicr. It was in the work of the latter that James first found a positive 
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notion of the "inevitable complicity of our active nature in our theoretic 
life" (442). James would have to reconcile the discoveries of Bergson with 
what he found most positive in Renouvier, clarifying within his own 
philosophy as he did so the specific powers of action and discontinuity. In 
these pages James can also be found setting down his views concerning 
the value of both descriptive method and empirical inquiry. James's 
scientific training sometimes made him "cry for a Galileo or a Lavoisier" to 
lift us from the level of flat description, thinking as he did that it is always 
only a matter of time before descriptive efforts are superceded by causal-
empirical discoveries (485). Yet the scientist in James never censored his 
descriptive ability when it was called for, as in a review of one of Royce's 
works: "Never was a philosophic work less dry; never one more suggestive 
of springtime, or, as we may say, more redolent of the smell of the earth. 
Never was a gentler, easier irony shown in discussion; and never did a 
more subtle analytic movement keep constantly at such close quarters 
with the cubical and concrete facts of human life as shown in individuals" 
(387-88). 
As we said earlier, one finds here an abiding interest in research 
concerning effort and initiative, volitional phenomena, the pathology of 
striving. James reviewed many books concerned with the excessive 
sensibility, lleerderscheinungen, paranoia, "clamorous impulses and 
obsess ions , " insani ty and the controversy over its t r e a t m e n t , 
somnambulism, hypochondria, neurasthenia, insomnia, and states of 
consciousness associated with experiences of the numinous. James may 
have coined the term melanchology, which could describe the study Julia 
Kristcva has recently done of affective energy disturbances which infiltrate 
action and communication in Dostoevsky and Nerval. In such research, 
which is one the one hand not opposed to philosophy accepting certain 
insights made available the challenge posed by the excess of being in the 
supposed non-knowledge of action, affectivity, and connotative dispersion. 
How to situate all this research into pathology? Perhaps many 
treatments of James's work start out too far ahead in their assumptions in 
the name of pragmatism. The material collected in this volume makes it 
clear how much James was concerned with everything that happens both 
before and as the taking of position. As in Heidegger, the "before" and the 
position-taking should not be split into a duality, but bonded or 
compounded within the movement of projection of/into possibility, in 
James's words becoming true (313). It is correct that truth is for James a 
sort of provisional cement that holds things together in order for the 
existent to accomplish something. But this also means our capacity to foist 
the Walt Whitman in each of us against the hori/on to confound the 
Schopenhauer in each of us (312). 
This it not to say that something like pragmatism, James's apparent 
misprision of Peircc's work, is merely a by-product of research into 
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pathological phenomena. But one should keep such research in view as 
one moves with James to consider an energy which forms a practical 
differential within/against what is circulating in the inertia of speculations 
and proofs; the energy of the linking up of instants in a guise or circuit 
which would discourse and will to appear as possible to the existent in the 
first place, when said existent is confronted with eternity or radical 
passivity. (How peculiar their relation is, radical belief and radical 
passivity.) One has to try and better situate in philosophical discourse 
such an energy, and a certain exigent narrativity or productive delirium: 
"the faith that comes of willing, the intoxication of moral volition" (287). 
This would bring lames much closer as a (New England-type) contributor 
to die frohliche Wissenschaft. 
Earl R. MacCormac, A Cognitive Theory of Metaphor. The M.l.T. 
Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1986. x + 254 pages. Reviewed by Anthonie W. 
M. Meijers, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands. 
Earl MacCormac has set himself a formidable task: "to develop the 
first unified cognitive theory of metaphor" (ix). His approach can be 
characterized as multidimensional, interdisciplinary and eclectic. This 
reflects among other things his position that philosophy should have "a 
proper empirical stance" (6). His theory draws from many sources, among 
which: cognitive science, psychology, anthropology, philosophy of culture, 
literary theory, aesthetics, semantics, fuzzy set theory, speech act theory, 
theory of knowledge and theory of truth. This leads to a theory of 
metaphor in which a great many aspects of meaning arc incorporated: 
s e m a n t i c meaning , l inguis t i c m e a n i n g , m e t a p h o r i c m e a n i n g , 
communicative meaning, cultural meaning, cognitive meaning and iconic 
meaning. It may truly be called a holistic theory of metaphor. 
The basic model of MacCormac combines three ideas. The first idea 
is that there is a cognitive process underlying every metaphor. Although 
metaphor may be described as a phenomenon of surface language (level 
one), or as a phenomenon of the deeper semantic and syntactic structure 
of language (level two), the real and deepest explanation comes from the 
knowledge process that underlies the making of a metaphor (level three). 
In metaphor the human mind intentionally combines concepts that are 
not normally associated to produce new insights or new hypotheses about 
the world, as for example in "quarks are colored." There is a cognitive 
process involved here and this should be seen in the wider context of the 
cognitive functioning of the human mind. Consequently MacCormac 
links his theory of metaphor to theories about memory, creativity, mental 
imagery and the recognition of similarities (chapter five). 
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The second idea is that metaphor always involves a semantic 
anomaly. Although MacCormac rejects the controversion theory of 
metaphor, according to which the literal reading of a metaphor always 
produces a contradiction, he wants to preserve that intuition that there is a 
some sort of conflict in metaphor. In metaphor semantic markers of the 
juxtaposed referents clash when taken in the ordinary literal sense, as can 
be seen in "quarks are colored." But this doesn't have to lead to a 
complete falsehood. To escape from this conclusion he develops a quasi-
formal semantics of metaphor, using fuzzy set theory for semantic makers 
(allowing for degrees of membership) and four-valued logic (allowing for 
partial truth). The four truth values are F, D, E, T . corresponding to 
degrees of similarity between the semantic markers of the referents of a 
metaphor. If there are very few similarities the metaphor should be called 
false (F); if the dissimilarities outweigh the similarities we have a very 
suggestive metaphor, called diaphor (D); if the similarities outweigh the 
dissimilarities we have a very expressive metaphor, called epiphor (E) ; 
finally if there are very few dissimilarities the metaphor should be called 
true (T) and this is what we call a dead metaphor. The life cycle of many 
metaphors is from diaphor via epiphor to dead metaphor, thereby 
increasing the degree of similarity and therefore of truth. According to 
MacCormac semantic anomaly is a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for metaphor (78), because not every juxtaposition of referents 
constitutes a meaningful metaphor based on a cognitive process. 
The idea of a semantic anomaly presupposes the distinction between 
the literal and the metaphorical. This is the third idea that MacCormac 
uses to build his basic model. It is central to his position. He rejects the 
idea that all language is metaphorical and the relativism that follows from 
it. 
' T h e contention that the hearer can distinguish between literal and 
metaphorical language is crucial to my theory of metaphor. Without 
such a distinction one would not be able to recognize metaphor as a 
special cognitive device that suggests new hypotheses. I also claim 
that the literal offers an Archimedean point for objectivity in 
knowledge" (227). 
Here he takes an objective line, using the work of Berlin and Kay on color 
and the work of Eleanor Rosch on categorizing and cultural prototypes. 
From this he concludes that there are cultural univcrsals that are natural 
in the sense that they reflect the way nature cut itself at its joints" (147). 
• Natural categories in literal language serve as bridges from language to 
the real physical world. This enables literal language to provide "a 
linguistic Archimedean point of reference from which one can discern 
language that is figurative" (215). 
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The basic model of MacCormac is embedded in an evolutionary 
opistemology. Language is an instrument for human survival (149) and 
metaphor functions as a device in the cultural and biological evolution of a 
mankind. There is an interaction, between mind and culture and between 
culture and biological environment. A change in culture will result in a 
change in biological environment, which will alter the biological evolution 
in the long run. Metaphor can accomplish such a change. For example, 
our culture changed when the metaphor o f "the mind as a mirror o f 
nature" became the dominant metaphor of the western world and 
MacCormac speculates that this will also affect our biological evolution 
(156). 
Taken as a whole the book is a huge theoretical building. Few books 
on metaphor cover such a large field and MacCormac deserves credit for 
it. Apart from the subjects mentioned there is a discussion of metaphor as 
a speech act (chapter six), of the iconic meaning of metaphor (chapter 
seven) and of the relation between metaphor and the coherence and 
correspondence theory of truth (chapter eight). Although the approach 
has been eclectic the resulting theory seems to be more or less coherent. 
The book contains a wealth of examples and is well written, although there 
is some needless repetition in it. Unfortunately but almost inevitably for a 
book of such a scope, there are a number of inaccuracies in it (for instance 
on page 183 where it is states that according to Fregc the reference of a 
sentence is its truth conditions instead of its truth value). 
But apart from this there is another and major drawback: the 
cognit ive theory of metaphor of MacCormac seems to have weak 
ontological foundations. His theory presupposes a basic metaphor - that 
the physical world is composed of natural categories (78). What this 
metaphor implies is not clear. On the one hand MacCormac agrees with 
Rosch position that the world provides structured information and 
presents the perceiver with natural categories that reflect the way nature 
cuts itself at its joints (147). On the other he seems to suggest that these 
categories are interactive rather than inherent (65), or are even projections 
of our cognitive categories on the world (96). The metaphor is also fuzzy 
because there is a tension between its field of application and the 
empirical evidence that is available. It is supported by the work of Berlin 
and Kay on color and of Rosch on cultural prototypes, but at the end of the 
book its application is extended by MacCormac to cover most of our 
common sense categories. "Metaphorical truth could be viewed as 
completely relative if it were not for its participation in this evolutionary 
process in which the stability of the ordinary, banal perceptions and 
expressions of the world in literal language provides an objective base for 
metaphor" (224). These ordinary categories are grounded in "universal, 
intersubjective, testable experience" (218). Apart from the fact that both 
the work of Berlin and Kay and of Rosch is not uncontroversial, by 
extending their work MacCormac seems to commit the fallacy of cognitive 
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imperialism: our common sense categories are seen as the universal 
categories of the world. 
More general, MacCormac's discussion of cultural universals suffers 
from the fact that most of the literature he uses is from the seventies. It 
neglects therefore a great deal of the discussion on relativism and the 
problematic status of cultural universals that followed. This can also be 
seen from the fact that the notion of convention is completely ignored. 
O n e may ask whether the distinction between the literal and the 
metaphorical needs to be based on such ontological claims at all. 
In the a f terword M a c C o r m a c a d m i t s that the o n t o l o g i c a l 
consequences of his theory need to be explored further (228) and he tries 
to anticipate criticism in this respect. But this will not do, because his 
ontology is not a consequence of the theory but a presupposition of it. If 
forms a crucial and integral part of the presented theory itself. T h e 
distinction between literal and metaphorical language and the idea of 
metaphor as necessary involving a semantic anomaly is based on it. So in 
the end the reader will wonder whether the foundations of this huge 
theoretical building are strong enough to support it. If not, the building as 
a whole will collapse. 
The Evidence of the Senses, by David Kellcy. Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
State University Press, 1986. 262 pages. Reviewed by Stephen Hicks, 
Indiana University. 
The Evidence of the Senses offers a highly original exposition and 
defense of direct realism. This book should be required reading for any 
professional with an interest in human cognition, but especially so for 
philosophers and psychologists with interests in perception and the basis 
of knowledge. Because of its comprehensiveness in covering the vast 
literature of the cpistemology of perception and because of the clarity of 
its prose, The Evidence of the Senses should also be attract ive to 
instructors looking for a text for graduate or upper-level undergraduate 
courses. 
The major theses of Part I of Kelley's book can be summarized as 
follows: Perception is a direct, preconceptual, noninferential mode of 
awareness of physical objects and their properties. A chapter or two is 
devoted to detailed expositions and defenses of each of this statement's 
constituent theses. 
Chapter 1 lays out the basic assumptions of Kellcy's realisms, his main 
arguments for the directness of perception, and his polemic against the 
basic assumptions and arguments of its rivals, rcpresentationalism and 
idealism. T h e chapter is more historical than the rest, discussing the 
m a j o r s o u r c e s o f the c o n t e m p o r a r y d e b a t e : D e s c a r t e s ' 
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rcprcsentationalism (10-16), Kant's idealism (16-27), and the traditional 
"mirror of nature" realisms. Chapter 1 is also the heart of the book, for it is 
here that Kelley sets the tone for what follows by laying out his guiding 
principles. Kelley presents his direct realism in the context of a dichotomy 
between two fundamental approaches to all issues of cognition: the 
primacy o f existence and the primacy of consciousness. The primacy of 
existence consists of two related these: (1) the real world, or "existence", 
exists independent ly of consciousness , and (2) consc iousness is 
fundamentally dependent upon reality for its contents. T h e primacy o f 
consciousness, in its purest form, denies each. Representationalism, on 
this analysis , is a middle ground, affirming that exis tence exists 
independently of our conscious states, while denying that the content of 
consciousness is fundamentally dependent upon that real world. After 
establishing an historical framework, and in the context of his distinction 
between primacy of existence and primacy of consciousness approaches, 
Kelley attempts to establish the axiomatic status of realism (27-31), to show 
the self-refuting nature of idealism (31-36), and to uncover two major 
(though not often discussed) issues that lie at the center of the controversy: 
the problem of integrating the 1st- and 3rd-person perspectives on 
perception (35-37), and the view that if the perception is to be direct then 
the means of perception must not affect the result in any way; perception 
must, according to this latter (and erroneous) view, be "diaphanous" (37-
43). 
Chapter 2 is concerned with the often-advanced claim that, since 
perceptual awareness is the result of the integration of vast amounts of 
sensory stimuli, perception is therefore inferential or computational. This 
conclusion is then often offered as supporting nativism (e.g. by von 
t lcmholtz , Fodor), or at least the indirectness of perception. Here, 
drawing on the work of perceptual psychologist J.J. Gibson and discussing 
the famous van Senden cases, Kelley is concerned to refute infercntialism 
in favor of the view that the necessary integrations of sensory stimuli can 
and should be conceived of as the result of non-computational, non-
inferential, physiological means. Kelley argues further that just as from 
the fact of sensory integration one cannot properly conclude that 
computation or inference is occurring, from the fact that sensory 
information is processed it does not follow that the resulting perceptual 
awareness is cognitively indirect. 
Chapter 3 is largely concerned with giving a realist account of 
perceptual relativity and the standard distinction between appearance 
and reality that it gives rise. to. Since the existence of relativity has often 
been seen as necessitating the epistemological subjectivity of perception 
and thus as presenting a major obstacle to the directness of perception, 
Kelley here explores the reasons why this has been so, what perceptual 
relativity actually should commit us to, and what the perceptual relativity 
actually should commit us to, and what the connection is between Ihe 
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related concepts "appearance" and "real i ty ." Kelley argues that 
perception is inherently relational, involving both an independent object 
and a subject with a specific means of consciousness, and that accordingly 
it is incorrect to conclude from the facts of perceptual relativity that the 
result of the contact between subject and object—perceptual awareness—is 
"in" one of the relata as opposed to the other. As an extended example of 
how this works out, Kelley looks in detail at the nature of color perception 
(95-111) and then applies it to the traditional primary/secondary quality 
distinction. (111-120). 
Chapter 4 is devoted to a critique of representationalism in its many 
and varied forms. Representationalism is here defined as any view that 
first makes a distinction between an internal, subjective content of 
awareness and an external object, and which then argues that the latter is 
not essential to the existence of the former. This implies that the internal 
content can be described without reference to any external object that 
may have caused it. Perception is thus seen, on the representationalist 
model, as of a kind with dreams and hallucinations, the only difference 
being that in the case of a perception, the internal content will have been 
caused by an external object. Kelley here notes an interesting connection 
between representationalism and adverbialism. Although adverbialism is 
offered as a direct realist account of perception, it shares with 
representationalism the view that, since any experience state can occur in 
the absence of an external object, experience is essentially nonrelational. 
And it is as non-relational theories of consciousness that Kelley critiques 
both (122-129). In the course of the chapter, and as a required element in a 
defense of direct realisms, Kelley also offers an original (to my knowledge) 
analysis of that phenomenon which is a major weapon in the arsenal of any 
representationalist (or idealist, for that matter): hallucinations (133-138). 
Perceptual relativity is again discussed, this time in the context of the 
representationalist interpretations of it (129-131). Also discussed are 
representationalist arguments which turn on a certain view of the causal 
processes involved in perception: How can direct realism handle the 
notorious dead star/time lag and double image issues (131-133)? What 
does it have to say about the possibility of scientists stimulating the 
appropriate nerve endings to produce "apparent" perceptions (138-141)? 
Chapter 5 summarizes and integrates the material in Part I, yielding a 
distinction between sensation, perception, and conception, and a formal 
definition of perception (143-164). Kelley then considers the relationship 
between conception and perception in greater detail , with special 
attention given to views on the "theory-ladenness" of perception, to 
arguments for perceptual discrimination (165-169), and to the role of 
attention in perceptual discrimination and learning. 
The two chapters that make up Part II range over some of the broader 
implications of Kclley's theory of perception for cpistemotogy in general, 
from issues such as the role of perception in grounding our knowledge, the 
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status of perceptual judgments and the need for a theory of concept-
formation, to the impl ica t ions of his direct rea l ism for the 
foundationalism/coherentism issue, and to how his realisms responds to 
the linguistic turn in philosophy this century (and especially to the 
linguistic versions of idealism which have gained wide currency--e.g., those 
of Quine, Sellars, and Korty). Kelley holds that perception justifies our 
beliefs about physical objects, and does supply a valid basis for our 
knowledge. However, his views on how this is achieved do not place him 
very neatly into the foundationalist camp--at least not as this camp has 
been defined and defended through much of this century. Perceptual 
evidence is also held to be non-propositional; Kelley thus rejects the 
widely-held thesis that any justification of a belief or propositional state 
must be in terms of or on the basis of other beliefs or propositional states. 
This book is worth a close reading. The argument is new, the historical 
and contemporary context of debate is presented e legant ly and 
accurately, and Kclley's own stance with respect to the historical and 
contemporary debate emerges clearly. 
Lyotard: Writing the Event, by Geoffrey Bennington: Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1988. 189 pages. Reviewed by G. Scott Budge. 
French philosophy since 1968 can, among other things, be said to 
complicate issues of authority and authorship, the metaphysics of 
presence and representation, and the secure place of the philosopher in 
society. Jean-Francois Lyotard, someone steeped in phenomenology, a 
former member of the socialisme ou barbarie group, crit ic o f 
structuralism, pro-Algerian activist, an astute reader of Freud and Lacan, 
and a name linked with post-modernism and post-structuralism, has been 
a key player in much of this upheaval. His strength and complexity as a 
philosopher is informed by his willingness and ability to read and write 
across many discourses, language-games, genres and "regimes of 
sentences" (his words). The scope and variety of his undertakings makes 
introducing Lyotard to English readers no easy task. 
Importantly, Geoffrey Bennington, in Lyotard: Writing the Event is 
well aware of the problem of representing, simplifying or valorizing such a 
figure as this. To narrate Lyotard in English is a project Bennington takes, 
on, however, with a great deal of integrity. He knows that one demand on 
such a book would require a "don't-worry-and-ril-explain-it-for-you" 1 style. 
Still, he will frustrate this and produce an important work of philosophy in 
its own right. Another demand is to find the essence of "Lyotard's" 
thought, which will be difficult given the various developments, reversals 
'G. Bennington, p. 4. 
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and discontinuities gathered up under the Lyotardian signature, itself a 
"fence around the terrain of writing, the grabbing by a supposed subject of 
products ipso facto raised to the dignity of an oevre? 
One powerful aspect of Bennington's narrative is tied up in Lyotard's 
and his concern about "gaining time," a way in this case of summarizing 
Lyotard for the English reader so as to preempt the necessity of reading 
Lyotard himself. In fact, Bennington is able to slow the pace of this book 
by breaking with conventional footnoting practices and interrupting his 
narrative with colliding segments (indented and in a smaller point size) of 
text. As a reader, I cannot just follow along. I am stopped midsentence in 
many cases by a compelling tract of orthogonal text. By the "end" of the 
book, 1 have "lost t ime" in a powerful interplay of discourses which 
themselves re-present Lyotard in a temporality which deliberately cares 
little for calendar t ime. 3 If acceleration inverts politics, 4 Bennington has 
slowed the apprehension of Lyotard and becomes dramatically convincing 
of Lyotard's "primarily political motivation for his work." 5 In fact, some of 
Lytoard's most unsettling, yet worthwhile work seems to lie in his 
articulation of problems of justice and political judgment, to which I will 
turn shortly. 
Lyotard's place within French intellectual stardom is complex . 
Bennington notes Lyotard's position in the shadow of figures like Deleuze, 
Foucault, Lacan, and Derrida but does not perhaps go far enough to 
situate his borrowings and differences from these thinkers. At first blush, 
Lyotard will a p p e a r - t o those familiar with recent French p h i l o s o p h y -
almost as a journalist interpreter of the superstars, whose respect he 
nevertheless commands. The familiar "Frenchifications" and a frequently 
cumbersome prose similarly mark much of Lyotard's work. More 
importantly, when Bennington discusses Lyotard's notion of the disposilif— 
the libidinal "set-up" in which, for example, the theatre, museum, factory 
or consult ing room stage and direct desire toward investment in 
representations which obscure activity of the director, curator, manager of 
analyst -he does the very thing Lyotard is trying to destabilize. Some of 
this is inevitable, and Bennington knows it. He must make Lyotard 
critically separate and place him under the microscope of a close reading. 
2 J . - F . Lyotard, Derive a partir de Marx et Freud (Paris: Union generate 
d'editions, 1973, p. 7; cited in Bennington, p. 3) . This position, of course, 
resonates with the one take by Michel Foucault, in "What is an Author?" 
reprinted in Language, countermemory, practice (D. F. Bouchard, ed. , 
Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press 1977, pp. 113-138). 
3 Bennington deals first with Economie Libidinale (1974), then Discours, 
figure (1971), and finally Le Diffirend (1984). 
4 S c e P. Virilio's Speed and Politics (New York: Scmiotext(e), 1986) for this 
argument. 
5 Bcnnington, p. 5. 
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Nearly making a "theory" of Lyotard, a Lyotardian dispositif, Bennington 
does not situate him as strongly as he could among the faqons de purler 
(Lyotard's expression) in which Lyotard is articulated. 
This said, the strength of Bennington's text lies in the way he writes 
Lyotard centrally into some of the most urgent philosophical and political 
issues of the times, which is where he belongs. The irreverent Economie 
Libidinale (the title of an important book by Lyotard and the title o f 
Bennington's Chapter 1) involves a movement to question the theoretical 
dispositif in the Marxist master-narrative. Rather than becoming one 
more Freudo-Marxist synthesis, it interrogates the question of the desire to 
theorize, the libidinal investments which produce theory and intellectuals 
in particular set ups just as a worker is set up to desire his own oppression. 6 
Bennington then shows how the previous work, the difficult Discours, 
figure (Bennington's Chapter 2) , anticipates the problems of Economie 
Libidinale and Le Diffirend. Its deconstruction of the Hegelian dialectic 
through a complex analysis of negation in the unconsciousness of seeing 
and speaking via the "anomaly" of deictics (words like this, that, here, 
there, etc.) is important to a surpassing of structuralist and semiological 
ways of "reading the world" and'secing a text." Lyotard posits three figural 
orders which inform and irrupt in discourse: imaginal (comparison, 
metaphor) , formal (an operation on the signifier) and sensory (a 
distribution of the plastic signifiers in a visual rhythm on a page) figures, 
which 
From a chain or relay between the intelligible discursive order and the 
sensory spatio-temporal order, they prove the presence of forms able 
to cross the barriers separating the intelligible world and the sensory 
world, forms independent of the milieu they inform. 7 
The figural will disrupt the distance knowledge conventionally makes of its 
object by virtue of its transgressive power as an event in both discourse 
and sensation. Hence, Bennington's title, Writing the Event, a title 
evoking other such related titles as Blanchot's The Writing of the Disaster 
or Clifford Marcus's Writing Culture. 
Bennington's explication of Le Diffirend in his third and final chapter, 
has Lyotard still concerned with the "event." In Le Diffirend, Lyotard 
deconstructs two apparently oppositional historiographies, one the realist 
account in which an event occurs and its narration follows, and the other 
that events are irrevocably fictions "purely 'produced' by the narrating 
agency . " 8 This apparent opposition is destabilized by a consideration of 
6 A similar case is made in G . Dcleuze and F. Cuattari's, Anti-Oedipus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrertia{Ncw York: Viking Press, 1977). 
7 J . -F . Lyotard, Discours, figure (Paris: Klincksieck, 1971, p. 71; cited in 
Bennington, p. 68). 
RBcnnington, p. 107. 
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the meta-narrational status to which each genre aspires. If, as Lyotard 
maintains, there is no meta-narrative, then what (or whose) narrative 
counts? The narrational positions of intellectuals, scientists or politicians 
are a matter for analysis and challenge for Lyotard. To put it simply, 
perhaps too schematically: there are genres (e.g. juridical, political, 
scientific) which employ heterogeneous regimes of sentences, each 
variously positioning or effacing a sender, addressee, referent and 
meaning in some pragmatically determined way. Le Diffirend is a 
condition which results (again i am oversimplyifying) from conflict 
between parties around a judgment where any rule of judgment is 
incommensurable with the genres of the conflicting parties. Restoring, for 
example, to a genres of the conflicting parties. Restoring, for example, to a 
genre of litigation for resolution leads to the wronging of one party's rules 
governing its genre. It amounts to a "forbidding of sentences" by a 
manner of linking sentences for or through someone which are alien to 
that part's genre. From Levinas Lyotard derives the necessity that each 
sentence is linked to and followed by another. What that next sentence is 
is a matter of radical contingency. Justice, for Lyotard, does not lie in the 
pursuit of a final sentence which passes judgment on its predecessors, but 
rather in the studied attempt to keep this contingency radicalized. 
Space requirements make it difficult to do Bennington's work justice, 
so to speak, just as Bennington is compelled to select from vast regions 
those sentences linkages he will use to introduce Lyotard. In my mind, 
however, he accomplishes his task in a first-rate manner and has written a 
very important book precisely because its careful explication opens a 
horizon of ethical conversations, sentences, that invite rather than 
proscribe that "next sentence" which is often too readily and automatically 
available from either the left or the right. It is a must read for anyone 
willing to reexamine the terra firma ethical systems since the great 
revolutions have mapped out for us in the West. 
